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Abstract—Memory errors such as buffer overruns are no-
torious security vulnerabilities. There has been considerable
interest in having a compiler to ensure the safety of compiled
code either through static verification or through instrumented
runtime checks. While certifying compilation has shown much
promise, it has not been practical, leaving code instrumentation
as the next best strategy for compilation. We term such compilers
Memory Error Sanitization Compilers (MESCs). MESCs are
available as part of GCC, LLVM and MSVC suites. Due to
practical limitations, MESCs typically apply instrumentation
indiscriminately to every memory access, and are consequently
prohibitively expensive and practical to only small code bases.
This work proposes a methodology that applies state-of-the-
art static analysis techniques to eliminate unnecessary runtime
checks, resulting in more efficient and scalable defenses. The
methodology was implemented on LLVMs Safecode, Integer
Overflow, and Address Sanitizer passes, using static analysis
of Frama-C and Codesurfer. The benchmarks demonstrate an
improvement in runtime performance that makes incorporation
of runtime checks a viable option for defenses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Security vulnerabilities resulting from unsafe memory ac-
cesses such as buffer overruns are notorious. Starting from the
highly publicized Morris worm in the 80s, exploits resulting
from memory safety errors have received considerable atten-
tion. Prevention of these errors has been a topic of intense
research over the past two decades.
While manual methods are currently the most widely
adopted approach, they are either error prone or tedious for
large applications as well as legacy code. We thus focus here
on automated approaches.
An attractive automated method for vulnerability protec-
tion is to use a compiler for ensuring safety of the code
it produces. Code that passes through a compiler can be
checked or retrofitted with defenses, and the approach can
be transparently applied to large codebases. In particular, in
several approaches, the compiler is used to instrument the
compiled code with runtime checks that ensure the safety of
memory related accesses. We term such compilers Memory
Error Sanitization Compilers (MESCs). MESCs have been
developed and available as part of compiler suites such as
GCC (as of gcc 4.8)1, LLVM framework (from Clang compiler
version 3.1)2 and MSVC (Microsoft Visual Studio platforms).
Since every piece of code that is compiled goes through
a compiler toolchain, it is possible for this approach to
be transparently applied to codebases that use the compiler
toolchain. Compared to stand-alone tools [5] for retrofitting
code, a compiler-based retrofitting strategy has a better chance
of critical mass adoption.
A main challenge with code that is retrofitted for memory
safety is performance. While there has been considerable
research in the recent past to address this issue, much of
this work has not become part of MESCs. One reason is that
compiler writers hesitate to include analysis algorithms of high
complexity in the compiler toolchain for reasons of (static)
compile-time performance. The GCC wiki3 has as rule 1: “Do
not add algorithms with quadratic or worse behavior, ever.”
Due to the lack of high-precision algorithms for performing
a precise instrumentation, MESCs typically apply instrumenta-
tion indiscriminately to every memory access. (Section II has a
brief analysis of the performance of LLVM’s instrumentation).
Hence, they do not scale, resulting in prohibitive overhead.
This work proposes a methodology to curb the performance
costs of software compiled with a MESC. Our approach is to
facilitate the use of state-of-the-art static analysis techniques
by incorporating their results inside the compiler to eliminate
unnecessary runtime checks, making this class of defenses
more efficient and scalable. Our main contribution is to build a
practical linkage between LLVM and static analysis tools and
use this to reduce sanitization overhead. The main benefits of
our approach are:
• No compiler modification for analysis: Our approach
utilizes the results of state-of-art analysis algorithms in-
side the compiler, without changing the compiler analysis
procedures. (Our approach does require modifications to
the retrofitting module of the compiler in order to make
use of these results.)




2016 IEEE International Conference on Software Quality, Reliability and Security
978-1-5090-4127-5/16 $31.00 © 2016 IEEE
DOI 10.1109/QRS.2016.44
323
results of any static analysis tool. In our implementation,
we have utilized the results of Frama-C and CodeSurfer,
two of state-of-the-art static analysis tools.
• Performance: Our approach has been tested with a variety
of benchmarks, including small and large applications.
These benchmarks demonstrate improvements in runtime
performance that make incorporation of runtime checks
a viable option for defenses.
This paper is organized as follows: Section II motivates
the work, describing the need for runtime checks and the
shortcomings of current implementations. Section III provides
the high-level architecture of the design. Section IV details the
implementation. Section V presents data from our experiments
using the method. Section VI describes previously published
work that address these issues. Conclusions are given in
Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Memory safety related errors constitute some of the most
critical security bugs in programs. There is a long history
of security incidents whose root-cause is due to errors such
as out-of-bounds access, integer overflow, and use-after-free
scenarios.
There is also a long history of security defenses for these
types of attacks, a focus of intense research over two decades.
Our focus here is on directly addressing vulnerabilities; miti-
gation defenses are discussed in Section VI.
Despite the intense level of focus, software vulnerabilities
abound. We discuss the main issues that contribute to this next.
Issue 1: Performance. The overhead of runtime checking that
is required to prevent memory safety errors has been high
(overheads from 2x to 80x). There has been considerable
progress made with respect to performance and we can hope
that this trend will lead to efficient defenses. However, given
that a wide range of software is developed and distributed,
in order to achieve critical mass, they need to be hardened
through developer-transparent toolchains. Compiler writers
have recognized this need, and have integrated memory error
sanitization techniques in the compilation cycle. As mentioned
earlier, we call these compilers Memory Error Sanitization
Compilers (MESCs). MESCs are an attractive solution to the
critical mass adoption problem and have been developed for
mainstream compiler suites, e.g., GCC, LLVM and MSVC.
While these sanitization passes are rarely incorporated in
production software due to performance concerns, their func-
tionality aids in testing, error detection and error diagnosis.
Issue 2: Precision. Practical (compile-time) performance re-
quirements on a production compiler do not facilitate using
advanced analysis techniques (for instance, using quadratic
or even super-linear algorithms). This limits the precision of
the analysis results and, in turn, the optimizations which can
be performed. Secondly, it requires non-trivial effort to build
compiler passes that incorporate algorithms yielding more
precise results. As a result of these two factors, end users
of MESCs do not benefit from the recent advances in static
analysis algorithms that could improve the runtime overheads
due to instrumentation.
Issue 3: Lack of critical mass adoption. Many defense tech-
niques developed have been through stand-alone implementa-
tions or ad-hoc extensions of existing compilers. For a defense
technique to become mainstream, critical mass adoption in a
developer-transparent toolchain framework is essential.
A. Analysis of runtime overheads
In a preliminary work we assessed candidate benchmarks
for testing the efficacy and usability of three sanitization
protocols, measuring the performance overhead imposed on
the applications by the inserted runtime checks [6]. The three
sanitization tools, Safecode [7], Address Sanitizer (ASAN) [8],
and Integer Overflow Checks (IOC) [9], are discussed in detail
below. Similar conditions obtained as for the measurement
runs reported in the Evaluation section (Section V). Our
runtime data are shown in Table I, which displays the over-
head with respect to the original introduced by the different
sanitizations.
We find large overhead for most of the benchmarks, with
some exhibiting a slowdown exceeding a factor of 90 times
slower than the original code; a few showed modest perfor-
mance cost, as low as 9%. These costs present a challenge to
the security community, for runtime enhancements to become
acceptable in production software. We note that for Safecode,
throughout our experiments, we used the production version
available at the official page 4, which, according to the devel-
opers does not incorporate certain unstable optimizations. The
current work addresses this situation by designing strategies
for targeted restriction of runtime checks insertion.
Benchmark Safecode IOC ASAN
oggenc 0.28 0.21 3.48
LasPack 30.30 0.97 4.29
gzip 15.70 0.22 0.94
debie1 46.12 0.56 4.46
appbt 97.98 4.85 2.60
bzip2 70.15 0.39 3.87
susan 18.23 2.35 4.12
quicklz 19.04 0.59 1.80
cpumaxmp64 4.00 0.09 0.07
linpack 28.00 0.34 3.44
NEC-Matrix 55.67 18.8 4.63
TABLE I: Benchmark Overhead due to Runtime Checks, for
Three Sanitization Tools
B. Optimizing runtime checks
To address Issue 1, current implementations of runtime
checks in MESC deal only with reducing the overhead of
the runtime infrastructure through a variety of implementation
strategies that involve the runtime data-structures (e.g., fat
pointers [7], [10], shadow memory [8], pool allocation [11]).
4http://safecode.cs.illinois.edu/
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Our solution to Issue 1 is to reduce the time overheads due
to runtime checks by making use of precise static analysis.
The results from such analysis are then used to remove those
checks that can be statically determined to be safe. Indeed,
every MESC employs several static analysis algorithms to per-
form optimizations, but production compilers typically restrict
these algorithms to the most efficient ones, not necessarily the
most precise.
To address Issue 2, we present a method to improve the time
performance of MESC compiled code by leveraging external
static analysis tools. We aim to develop an approach that has
the same safety guarantees of a conventional MESC without
the runtime overheads, specifically retaining memory safety
while removing unnecessary checks. To guarantee the safety,
if proof cannot be obtained, we leave the checks untouched.
We highlight that while using external static analysis tools
will add their running times as overhead to the compilation,
very often, for safety critical programs (e.g., web servers), such
cost may be justified by the better performance and security
at runtime.
Finally, to address Issue 3, we build a general method of
propagating information and assertions from different static
analysis tools into the LLVM optimization chains.
III. DESIGN
To leverage the analysis power of current tools for MESCs,
we design a methodology that connects the analysis tools with
the safety instrumentation frameworks. This path is responsi-
ble for transporting analysis information related to runtime
checks from external analysis tools, through a compiler’s
front and back-end, to the code that implements the safety
instrumentation (Figure 1). We highlight that while some
information-propagation infrastructure exists inside compilers
to transport information from the front-end to the backend
(e.g., # pragma directives or profiling metadata), this is highly
specialized and can be used only for very specific optimization
purposes. Our framework, in contrast, provides a general way
to bring any analysis information generated by external an-
alyzers, to any safety instrumentation implementation, where
such information can be used.
In a larger context, not explored in this paper, our framework
may be used to open a path among external analyzers and other
back-end optimizations, further enhancing them by providing
high quality analysis information, which is not available to a
production compiler.
Requirements and issues. Our design is required to preserve
the safety of the checks inserted by the MESCs. This must be
guaranteed by the established soundness of the external tool
analysis, restricting the choice of these tools. Given sound
analysis, we must then bridge the semantic gap between
tool output, and the assertion descriptions to be injected into
the code: each tool has its own representation for analysis
results, and these must be translated to a form usable by the
compiler. Finally, the representation within the compiler of
these analyses must not interfere with the ordinary work of
the compiler.
1 int* p = (int*) malloc(100*sizeof(int));
2 int i=0;
3 while(i<100) {







11 p[i] = 0;
Listing 1: The running example in C source
1 if(shadow(i)!=0) throw_UAF_Exception();
2 while(i<100) {
3 if(i< 0 || i >= getSize(p))
4 throw_OOB_Exception();
5 if(shadow(p[i]) !=0) throw_UAF_Exception();
6 t = multiply.with.overflow(i, i);
7 if(t.overflow == true)
8 throw_IOF_Exception();
9 p[i] = t;
10 i++;
11 }
Listing 2: Program snippet from the running example (the
for loop is not shown) with runtime checks
Overview. A high level view of the main components and
steps along this path is depicted in Figure 1. In the first
step, C programs are given as input to external analyzers,
which produce facts and information useful for removing
unnecessary runtime checks; this information is encoded as
assertions. For instance, if a runtime check’s purpose is to
catch out of bounds access, the information in the assertions
is about object boundaries and variable ranges. In the next
step, the assertions are given as input to the compiler’s front-
end and are transported through the parsing and Intermediate
representation (IR) code generation phases to the back-end.
In the back-end, the information contained in the assertions is
associated with the intermediate code and transported through
the chain of optimizations to the instrumentation framework,
where it is finally used to remove checks.
After introducing a running example, in the rest of this
section, we provide details about each of these steps.
Running Example. To illustrate our approach, we provide
a simple running example in Listing 1 containing several
operations that are instrumented with runtime checks. In
reality, these runtime checks are inserted in the intermediate
code generated by the front end, however, we show them in
the source code for clarity. In Line 4, the variable i is used
as an index into the array starting at p, where such access
might cause an out of bounds access for values of i greater
than 100. In the same line, i is also used as the operands
of a multiplication, whose result may cause integer overflow
for large values of i. Finally, in Line 8, the variable p is
deallocated, and then used in Line 11. To prevent memory
safety errors, MESCs insert runtime checks into the program.
Listing 2 illustrates such checks, related to the while loop
from Listing 1.
Lines 1 and 5 of Listing 2 contain checks inserted by
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Fig. 1: Steps on the Pathway from the Analysis Tools to the Safety Instrumentation
Address Sanitizer. Address Sanitizer creates for every memory
region, such as the memory region where p[i] is allocated,
a shadow memory location, which contains the status of the
program’s region. When the program’s memory region is not
valid anymore (e.g., because of free), Address Sanitizer
sets the shadow region to a non-zero value. In our example,
the check in Line 5 computes the shadow memory location
associated with the variable p[i], which is used inside the
condition of the while loop, and checks that it is still
allocated.
Lines 3-4 contain another runtime check, inserted by Safe-
code. The check verifies that the access is within the bounds
of the array pointed by p and throws an exception if this
is not true. The function getSize exemplifies the Safecode
operations to retrieve the runtime size of the object pointed
to by p. Finally, Lines 6-8 contain the code transformed
by the Integer Overflow Check instrumentation. Here, the
original multiplication is substituted with a safe multiplication
function, which returns a structure containing the result and a
flag indicating if overflow occurred.
Evidently, the runtime checks inserted in Listing 2 by the
safety instrumentations are not necessary. In fact, the value of
i is between 0 and 100 for every possible run, therefore out of
bounds checks and integer overflow checks are not necessary.
In addition, the use of p[i] inside the while loop occurs
before the free, therefore a check for detecting use after free
is not necessary for that use.
We highlight at this point that existing compiler optimiza-
tions, such as O3, are, in general, not able to determine if
the runtime checks are unnecessary. This is due to several
reasons. First, many runtime checks are implemented as calls
to functions that are not available at compile time but are
linked with the code in a later phase. In addition, due to
efficiency constraints, the algorithms used by these optimizers
to analyze the code do not perform an analysis as deep as
other static analysis tools who do not have those constraints.
Additional optimizations performed by MESCs, are in general
concerned with other aspects of the implementation. For
instance, Safecode uses several link time optimizations to
remove checks on bounds checks to single-element objects
(e.g., scalars, or single element arrays), or uses caching of
previously accessed arrays in the look-ups, so that a bounds
check that has already been performed is removed.
Our framework brings such information from static anal-
ysis tools to MESCs, improving the performance of target
programs by reducing unnecessary runtime checks. In the
following subsections, we present different steps in this path:
carrying assertions from static analysis tools to the compiler
back-end, and leveraging the compiler to use the provided
assertions to produce optimized code.
A. Deep Analysis
The goal of this step is to use external analyzers to produce
information about a program, which can be used to remove
unnecessary runtime checks. To remove runtime checks ded-
icated to preventing out of bounds memory accesses and use
after free bugs, we use two external analysis tools: Frama-
C [12], [13] and CodeSurfer [14], [15]. These tools exhibit sev-
eral advantages with respect to LLVM’s analysis capabilities.
They can perform whole program analysis, spanning multiple
compilation units and procedures. Furthermore, they are not
as constrained as LLVM with respect to performance, and can
perform a deeper and more complex analysis.
Frama-C. This is an analysis framework for C programs,
which can be extended by many plugins that perform different
types of analysis 5. One of its most widely used plugins is
the Value Analysis plugin, which derives the value ranges that
variables can assume at runtime using abstract interpretation.
When available, these ranges can determine at compile time if
an out of bounds access is possible. The results of Frama-C’s
value analysis are guaranteed to be sound [13]. For instance,
in Listing 1, Frama-C is able to determine that the range of
the index i is between 0 and 100 for every possible program
execution. Therefore, the access to the array in Line 4 will
never be out of bounds and the out of bounds check for
that operation can be removed. Furthermore, using the same
bounds information derived by Frama-C, we can infer that the
result of the multiplication in Line 4 can never overflow and
therefore an integer overflow check related to that operation
can be removed.
CodeSurfer. This framework provides different types of facil-
ities for analyzing full programs, as well as an API to build
plugins for customized queries over the code. After the code
is parsed, several program representations are built, including
full program abstract syntax trees, control flow graphs, and
system dependency graphs. The latter represent the data and
5http://frama-c.com/plugins.html
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control dependencies among program points. If the value of
a variable at a point A depends on operations carried out at
a point B, there is a data dependency edge from B to A. If
execution of A depends on some condition at a point C, then
there is a control dependency edge from C to A.
Data and control dependencies provide valuable information
about the possible order of execution of program points. A data
dependency edge between points A and B means there is at
least one path in the control flow graph where A is executed
before B. This precedence information establishes a relative
order of execution between program points containing free
statements and statements where pointers are used, which is
used to determine if the use of a variable appears before or
after a free statement.
For instance, in Listing 1, executing a backward slice query
from the program point at Line 8, returns the program points
for Lines 1 and 4, which contain the variable p used in Line
8. A forward slice query instead returns the program point
11, which is affected by the execution of Line 8. Once these
dependencies are discovered, they can be used to assert that
any use of a pointer that does not have a dependency from a
free statement is safe; therefore the runtime check associated
with that use can be removed.
To use these programs as external analyzers in our frame-
work, there are several issues that need to be resolved.
Information granularity. One of the main problems in
using external analyzers for removing checks is that of the
granularity between the operations and information produced
by these analyzers, and the operations of the safety instru-
mentation frameworks. In fact, the latter usually operate at
the LLVM IR level, while the former at the source code
level. For instance, Safecode instruments with runtime checks
the LLVM IR code, while the Frama-C analyzer performs
abstract interpretation on the C source code and computes the
variables’ value ranges.
To deal with this problem, we fix the granularity to the
source variables’ uses and definitions, and thus retrieve from
the analyzers information about variable uses and definitions.
The advantage of this choice is that these uses are readily
available to the instrumentation framework of the compiler.
Analysis soundness. External static analyzers, in general,
employ several approximations leading to false positives and
negatives. To ensure that our framework does not violate the
safety provided by the instrumentation frameworks, only sound
analysis results are used to remove checks. The practical effect
of this choice is that a significant percentage of runtime checks
may not be removed.
B. Annotation Capture
Once the information about variable uses and definitions is
produced by the external analyzers, it needs to be propagated
to the back-end. There are several challenges to address in this
step.
Language Heterogeneity. The information derived from ex-
ternal analysis must track the compiler mapping from source
code language to the intermediate representation. Due to
the static single assignment (SSA) nature of the LLVM
intermediate representation (IR) language, one source code
variable can be mapped to multiple IR variables, and a source
statement may be split into different statements. We solve
this problem by using debug information, which contains a
mapping between source and LLVM variables, as well as
by injecting the assertions as special constant strings in the
program (see Listing 4).
Analysis Format. Another issue in this step is integration
of the analysis results from different external analyzers in
a common representation format, which can be used for
different instrumentations. In particular, we design two types
of assertions, one expressing the range of every variable use,
and another expressing the safety of that use with respect
to free statements. We provide more details about these
assertions in Section IV-B.
C. Transport to the Backend
Once the assertions are available to the back-end, they
are propagated through the chain of optimizations to the
instrumentation passes. The main challenge in this step is the
fact that the optimizations along the chain may change the
code by transforming and removing instructions. For example,
consider LLVM’s mem2reg optimization, which minimizes
the traffic between memory and registers by removing unnec-
essary load and store statements, by inserting phi nodes
into the code, and so on. This code transformation modifies
the mappings between source and LLVM variables discovered
in the previous step, thus invalidating the assertions.
A general solution to this problem is provided in a prior
work [16]. In general, to ensure mapping correctness, wit-
nesses to the transformations performed by the optimization
passes can be inserted for each pass with very little implemen-
tation overhead. These witnesses are responsible for relating
the target and the source program after every optimization and
can be used to update the assertions correspondingly. However,
in this paper, we do not use such solution, since the code is
not transformed before it reaches the instrumentation passes,
and thus the assertions are always correct.
Two of the more problematic transformations for our ap-
proach are the introduction of temporary variables in LLVM to
hold intermediate results or the deletion of LLVM instructions.
To deal with this problem, we try to associate as many instruc-
tions as possible with the corresponding assertions, so that
even when instructions are deleted we can recover assertion
information from the remaining instructions. In addition, we
compute new assertions by using existing ones. For instance,
if the range of two variables is known, the range of their
multiplication is computed and an assertion about this range
is attached to the LLVM variable that stores the result of
the multiplication. We provide more details about this task
in Section IV-C.
D. Check Elimination
When the assertions reach the instrumentation passes, the in-
formation they contain determines whether a check is needed.
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In particular, to remove Safecode out of bounds checks,
we use two types of information: 1) the range information
associated with the variables and discovered by Frama-C,
and 2) the size of arrays (when known at compile time). If
such information is known, then the check is as simple as
determining if the values contained in range of the variable
fall within the array size. When this check is positive, we can
avoid the insertion of the runtime check.
For Address Sanitizer, a similar elimination procedure is
used. In this case, the information about the safety of a pointer
use is already available and no further computations need to be
done. If a memory access is associated with an assertion that
claims that it is safe, we skip the runtime check insertion. For
instance, Listing 3 shows the code resulting from removing the
unnecessary checks. As can be seen, the only remaining check
is that in Lines 9-10, since there is a dependency between Line
6, where the variable p is freed and Line 11, where it is used.
1 while(i<100) {









11 p[i] = 0; //use after free
12 }
Listing 3: Optimized program after leveraging assertions
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
Our implementation is built on top of LLVM 3.4 (We used
version 3.2 for Safecode due to compatibility). LLVM is a pop-
ular compiler back-end, which is used to perform a wide range
of optimizations and final code generation. The optimizations
in LLVM are structured as a sequence of passes that operate
on an intermediate representation of the code called LLVM
bytecode (LLVM IR), which is generated by the compiler’s
front-end. The safety instrumentations are built as additional
passes on top of the other passes in LLVM. They operate by
intercepting LLVM load and store statements (Safecode
and Address Sanitizer), which load and store values from
memory locations to registers, and by inserting runtime checks
before those statements. Our implementation is composed of
a series of tools that extend this architecture. A high level
overview of our architecture is shown in Figure 2.
In the first step of the implementation architecture, the
program files are given as input to Frama-C or CodeSurfer.
In particular, the Value Analysis Plugin of Frama-C is used to
derive the variable ranges and remove the bounds and integer
overflow checks, while CodeSurfer to remove the use after free
checks. These two tools have been extended by plugins that we
wrote to perform the analysis and to generate analysis results
useful for removing unnecessary checks. The results are output
from each tool separately as lists of assertions associated with
a line number and a file name. Next, our rewriter uses this list
of assertions to inject them in the source code at the specified
line number. The output is an annotated file, as shown in
Listing 4 where each of the lines 2-3, 6-8, 10, and 17, contains
an assertion about the use of the variables in the first line of
the original code following those assertions.
Next, the annotated C source file is passed as input to Clang,
the LLVM compiler front-end, which translates it to LLVM
IR, without performing any code optimizations. The resulting
LLVM IR is next passed in input to an LLVM pass that
we develop, the Assertion Mapper pass, which is responsible
for mapping the source variables to the LLVM variables and
associating the source assertions with the LLVM instructions.
The output of this step is an annotated LLVM IR file, where
the annotations contain the assertions about the value ranges
and the uses before the free statements. Finally, the LLVM
bytecode is given as input to the safety instrumentation passes,
Safecode and ASAN (Address Sanitizer), which have been
modified to read the annotations and use them to avoid the
insertion of unnecessary runtime checks.
We next provide details about each of these steps.
A. Analyzers Implementation
Frama-C plugin Implementation. Frama-C framework [12],
[13] analyzes C source files and computes the value-range
information of variables. The computation is performed by a
Frama-C built-in plugin, the Value Analysis plugin. However,
the computed ranges are internal to the Frama-C framework
and cannot be explicitly extracted. To perform such extraction,
we implemented a Frama-C plugin using the APIs provided
by this tool. This plugin visits every instruction in the AST
tree inside Frama-C, extracts all the variables at each node,
and queries the value analysis plugin for each variable to get
the corresponding value ranges. The results are then stored in
an annotation specification file to be used later by the rewriter.
The specification and the rewriter are described in subsection
IV-B below.
CodeSurfer plugin Implementation. To ultimately remove
the checks inserted by Address Sanitizer we built a plugin for
CodeSurfer that executes the following two tasks:
1) Using the data dependency graph, we issue backward
and forward slicing queries to find the order of execution
among statements containing a call to a free and
statements that use the pointer being freed. If there exists
a dependency edge from a statement free(p) to a
statement where pointer p (or any of its aliases) is used,
then there exists a potential use after free vulnerability.
This implies that the Address Sanitizer’s checks inserted
at those uses must not be removed. If, on the other hand,
there exists a dependency between a statement where a
pointer p (or any of its aliases) is used and a statement
free(p), then the statement is executed before the
free(p) along some path. Finally, if dependencies
exist in both directions, then the two statements can be
executed in any order.
2) Find the program points that contain uses that are not




























Fig. 2: Implementation Architecture.
uses for which runtime checks are inserted by Address
Sanitizer, but which are not usually freed in a program
(e.g., non pointer variable uses).
The plugin uses Codesurfer’s APIs to execute both tasks and
outputs a file of annotations about the safety of the program
points, together with line numbers. The output of the plugin is
an assertion file associated with every source code file. Each
assertion contains the safety information of the corresponding
variable use, together with the line number where that use
occurs.
B. From the Analyzers to the Frontend
To provide a common framework for both the out of
bounds and use after free optimizations, we specify
an assertion language to express value-range and memory
safety information. This specification is designed to represent
value-range and memory safety assertions about variables in
each program location. The syntax of our specification is
described in Table II. The basis syntax includes file name, line
of code, and assertions. We need both file name and line of
code to instrument the assertions in the right place. There are
two type of assertions: (1) value-range assertions represents
the value range and (2) safety memory of a specific variable.
<assertion spec> ::= filename:lineofcode#assertions
<assertions> ::= (@assert <assertion>;)+
<assertion> ::= <value assertion>
| <safety assertion>
<value assertion> ::= <expression> (’&&’<expression>)∗
| <expression> (’||’<expression>)*
<expression> ::= <variable> op <value>
op ::= ′ ==′ | ′ >=′ | ′ <=′
<safety assertion> ::= safe(<variable>)′ =′ boolean
<variable> ::= <string literal>
<filename> ::= <string literal>
<lineofcode> ::= integer
<value> ::= integer | real
TABLE II: Syntax of the common assertion language
As our framework is designed to use different analysis tools,
we need a consistent way to introduce assertions into code. To
this end, we develop a transformation tool to embed assertions
into the program in the form of string variables, which
are specially named to avoid interference with the existing
program variables. These variables are injected before the
corresponding instructions in the source, and are propagated
1 i n t ∗ p = ( i n t ∗ ) ma l l oc (100∗ s i z e o f ( i n t ) ) ;
2 char∗ a s s e r t 1 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t i ==0 ’ ’ ;
3 char∗ a s s e r t 2 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t s a f e ( i ) = t r u e ’ ’ ;
4 i n t i =0 ;
5 whi le ( i <100) {
6 char∗ a s s e r t 3 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t i>=0 && i <100 ’ ’ ;
7 char∗ a s s e r t 4 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t s a f e ( p ) = t r u e ’ ’ ;
8 char∗ a s s e r t 5 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t s a f e ( i ) = t r u e ’ ’ ;
9 p [ i ] = i ∗ i ;
10 char∗ a s s e r t 6 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t i>=0 && i <100 ’ ’ ;
11 i ++;
12 }
13 . . . .
14 f r e e ( p ) ;
15 . . . .
16 f o r ( i =0 ; i <100; i ++){
17 char∗ a s s e r t 7 = ‘ ‘ @asse r t s a f e ( p )= f a l s e ’ ’ ;
18 p [ i ] = 0 ; / / u se a f t e r f r e e
19 }
Listing 4: Program from the running example with in-
jected assertions
to the compiler back-end through the standard code generation
phase of the Clang front-end.
This transformation is based on CIL (C Intermediate Lan-
guage) [17]. CIL is a high-level representation of C programs
that is lower-level than AST and higher-level than typical
intermediate languages. CIL has a set of tools for static
analysis and transformation of a valid C program using a few
core constructs with clean semantics. Our CIL plugin takes as
input a C source file and the corresponding set of assertion
specifications, and visits all instructions in that C source file
and injects the assertions. Listing 4 demonstrates the output of
our transformation tool that inject assertions in string variables
in corresponding source location.
C. Backend Implementation
Since the assertions are inserted in the source code file
as assignments to string variables, these assignments are
translated by the Clang frontend together with the rest of
the program. To attach the assertions to the LLVM IR code,
so that they are available to the instrumentation passes, we
designed an Assertion Mapper LLVM pass. This pass is run
immediately after the code generation phase of Clang, before
any other optimization passes. In fact, since the assertion
assignments are semantically orthogonal to the rest of the
program and not used anywhere else, they may be removed by
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1 %1 = load %i
2 %2 = load %i
3 %3 = mul %1, %2
4 %4 = load %i
5 %5 = load %p
6 %6 = GEP(%5 , %4)
7 s t o r e %3, %6
Listing 5: LLVM IR code compiled from the running
example
the optimization passes as dead code. The Assertion Mapper
pass works according to the steps described below.
Source-IR mapping. The Assertion Mapper’s first job is
the creation of a mapping between all source code variables
and the corresponding LLVM allocated memory locations.
This mapping is necessary for associating assertions with the
correct instructions in the LLVM IR code. This mapping is
created by using the debug information contained in the code,
which provides the name of the source variable for every
LLVM allocated memory location.
For instance, in Listing 5, we show the portion of the LLVM
IR code corresponding to the assignment p[i] = i*i; in
the source code. In the Listing, identifiers start with a %
sign. In Lines 1-2, there are two copies of the variable %i
loaded into two registers %1 and %2 before the multiplication
in Line 3. Next, the value of the pointer p is loaded into a
register %5, and the pointer to the i-th element starting from
p is obtained through the GetElementPointer (GEP)
instruction. Finally, the result of the multiplication is stored
into that element.
As can be noted from the example, there are several copies
of the value of the variable i, each one having a different
name. Therefore, an assertion about i (e.g., an assertion that
the range of i is between 0 and 100) is valid for all those
copies and needs to be associated with all of them. To solve
this issue, we use the debug information, which contains a
mapping among C source variables and LLVM IR memory
locations.
Metadata attachment. Next, for every load, store and
gep instruction, the corresponding assertions are extracted
from the code, with the help of the previously created map-
ping, and attached to those instructions as LLVM metadata.
An example of the output of this step is shown in Listing
6. For every LLVM instruction, the text after the ! shows
the safecode-related metadata. These contain the range infor-
mation corresponding to the value contained in the LLVM
identifier. For instance, the metadata associated to the variable
%4 in line 4 provides the range of the array index, and the
metadata associated to line 5 provides the size of the array.
The GEP instruction returns a pointer to the element indexed
by the variable %4 inside the array starting at the memory
address pointed by %5.
The metadata related to the Address Sanitizer’s check are
similarly attached to load and store statements. These
1 %1 = load %i ! ‘ ‘%1 >= 0 && %1 < 100 ’ ’
2 %2 = lo ad %i ! ‘ ‘%2 >= 0 && %2 < 100 ’ ’
3 %3 = mul %1, %2 ! ‘ ‘%3 >= 0 && %3 < 10000 ’ ’
4 %4 = lo ad %i ! ‘ ‘%4 >= 0 && %4 < 100 ’ ’
5 %5 = lo ad %p ! ‘ ‘ s i z e (%5) = 100 ’ ’
6 %6 = GEP(%5 , %4)
7 s t o r e %3, %6
Listing 6: LLVM IR Annotated with Assertion Metadata
metadata simply contain information about the safety of the
instruction.
Metadata propagation. An additional task of the Assertion
Mapper is to propagate metadata to the temporary variables
that appear in the LLVM IR. In particular, given an instruction,
Assertion Mapper checks if the operands of the instruction
contain any metadata, and if possible, merges those metadata
using the same semantics of the instruction and assigns the
new metadata to the result of the operation. For instance, in
Listing 6, the assertions about the variables %1 and %2, are
used to derive the assertion attached to the multiplication result
in Line 3. Currently, Assertion Mapper supports this propaga-
tion for LLVM’s arithmetic and sign extension operations.
D. Check Removal Implementation
To remove the insertion of run time checks by Safecode and
Address Sanitizer, we modify the code of the corresponding
LLVM passes. Our modification includes additional code that
intercepts the same load, store, and gep instructions
intercepted by these passes and reads the metadata associated
with those instructions.
Safecode checks removal. Safecode uses several LLVM
passes for adding the out of bounds run time checks.
These passes are responsible for tracking the allocated regions,
storing their sizes, and checking that every access to those
regions does not fall outside of the bounds. In particular, for
every array access, the run time check inserted by Safecode
ensures that the pointer to the referenced array element does
not fall out of the array bounds.
In our implementation, we modify each of these passes.
In particular, our implementation starts by reading the range
associated with an array index from the metadata and retrieves
the size of the array using the LLVM API. For instance, in
Listing 6, the metadata associated with the arguments (%4,
%5) of the LLVM GEP instruction, contain the size of the
array and the range of the index. For fixed sized arrays that are
allocated inside the same function as the array access (either
on the stack or on the heap), the size information is readily
available. For arrays that are passed as parameters in input to
a function, the size determination is more complex. In fact,
the array may have been allocated in any of the callers of
that function or any of its predecessors in the function call
graph, and it may have been passed in as a parameter along
the sequence of function calls. That is, at run time the array
may have any number of sizes depending on the caller. To
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retrieve the array size, we travel backwards one step in the
function call graph and retrieve the possible array sizes. If the
sizes can be retrieved this way, we use the minimum size,
as the safest option. When the size of the array cannot be
determined in this way, we choose the safest course of action
and do not remove the run time check.
Integer overflow check removal. The implementation
of the integer overflow checks removal is very
similar to that of Safecode. In particular, our
implementation removes the checks that are inserted by
the -fsanitize=signed-integer-overflow and
-fsanitize=unsigned-integer-overflow options
of Clang. These checks are inserted by the frontend, which,
based on the signedness of the operands, replaces several
arithmetic operations with equivalent LLVM intrinsics during
the code generation. For instance, additions of signed integers
are replaced with llvm.sadd.with.overflow. In
addition, the pass inserts a check over the overflow flag set
by the LLVM intrinsic. In our implementation, we intercept
every such intrinsic accompanied by a check of its overflow
flag, and, if the variable ranges of the operands are available,
we perform the same arithmetic operation using the value
ranges as operands. Next, we compare the resulting value
range with the maximum integer of the framework and
remove the check if all the values of the range fall below that
maximum integer. In some cases, Frama-C’s value analysis
produces ranges that include −∞ or +∞ or both. In these
cases, we do not remove the integer overflow checks.
Use after free check removal. The implementation of this
check is fairly simple. In the same way as for the other instru-
mentations, we intercept every load and store instruction
that Address Sanitizer intercepts. Next, we read the metadata
information that tells us if the instruction is safe. In this case,
we skip the check insertion.
V. EVALUATION
A. Setup
The results of our approach are shown below. Our frame-
work incorporates out-of-bounds runtime checks inserted by
LLVM passes for Safecode, address sanitizer, and signed and
unsigned integer overflow sanitizer. The evaluation was done
by instrumenting each benchmark program to track and output
user time for the course of its execution. Each program was
run at least ten times and the times were averaged. Our runtime
tests were performed on a GNU-Linux machine running the
LINUX Ubuntu distribution 12.04, on an Intel Xeon CPU at
2.40GHz.
B. Benchmarks
We selected open source test applications that cover a range
of sizes and operational characteristics. Some applications
were CPU-intensive, like the matrix manipulation and equa-
tion solver programs, and some were I/O intensive, like the












Laspack Solve large sparse
systems of equations
7656 100 1.31%













susan Image processing 1463 109 7.45%














Matrix operation with a
fixed size
113 70 61.95%
TABLE III: Benchmark Source Size and Annotation Coverage
programs had small line counts, with less than 2000 non-
commentary source lines (CLOC); half were larger appli-
cations with thousands of non-commentary source lines. To
illustrate the optimizations of our framework, we selected
benchmarks with a wide range of non-commentary source
lines, also looking for many (hundreds) of array references.
Table III illustrates the source code line counts and the
percentage of source lines that were annotated by Frama-C,
with variable value range information. The chart is ordered
from largest to smallest total CLOC; the display is divided
between two groups of large and small line counts, in this
table and in the next several figures.
There is a weak anti-correlation between line counts and
annotation coverage. Typically, no more than 25% of the
source lines were annotated; for some applications the per-
centage is very low, 1-2%. The smallest benchmark, NEC-
matrix, achieved the highest annotation rate, at 62%. In the
discussion to follow we find it useful to divide the benchmarks
into large and small groups, with a cutoff at around 2000
CLOC. Generally there are higher percentages of annotated
lines in the smaller benchmarks, with some exceptions. The
two largest benchmarks have among the lowest annotation
rates, due to large portions of the programs depending on
runtime values not available to Frama-C. In such cases the
abstract interpretation finds relatively few instances of sound
results. This in turn impacts the number of checks that are
removed, since we only remove checks related to annotations.
C. Annotation Analysis
The next three figures illustrate strategically removing
runtime checks that our analysis proved were safe to remove,
thereby improving benchmark performance. Each chart shows
benchmarks ordered from the largest to the smallest. Two
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Fig. 3: Safecode Benchmarks Performance
checks that were removed by our protocol, and the percentage
of the performance overhead due to runtime checks that was
recovered by the framework:
%Overhead Removed = 1 − R − OC − O
where R is the performance with checks removed, C is the
performance with all checks present, and O is the performance with
no checking.
Safecode. Figure 3 shows results following removal of Safe-
code checks. We note that those checks, added by Safecode,
are not removed by the O0-3 optimizations. This class of
runtime checks had the most severe effect on performance
overhead, as seen above in Table I. Measuring the performance
benefits of check removal, we see mixed results, ranging
from no recovery of overhead, all the way to 100% recovery.
The latter is associated with the benchmark with the smallest
measured overhead, so its impact on absolute program effort
is not as great as it is for programs with larger overhead
penalties. We attribute results showing no overhead recovery
to the removal of safety checks in regions of code that are
seldom executed, such as initialization code. Results with
significant overhead recovery are attributed to checks removal
in frequently executed code, particularly program loops. This
effect was manually verified in some smaller benchmarks.
There is not close tracking between the percentage of checks
removed and the percentage of runtime recovery, since there is
wide variation over whether removed checks are in frequently
executed sections of code.
Integer Overflow. In the experiments on integer overflow































































Fig. 4: Integer Overflow Check Benchmark Performance
mance improvement due to removal of checks are more sub-
stantial than was seen in the Safecode experiments; again, the
values are quite variable across all the benchmarks. Here the
improvements in performance roughly correlate with removal
of runtime checks, with some exceptions. We note that these
experiments were conducted using O3, so the improvements
are after O3 optimizations. The LasPack results illustrate how
removal of a few percentage points of checks can recover
most of the overhead; this strong benefit would be difficult
to achieve by manual analysis.
For removal of integer overflow checks, not only are the
overhead recovery measurements quite robust, with 7 of the
11 programs exceeding 40% removal, but overhead levels are
much smaller than with Safecode. Therefore these results rep-
resent strong measurable gains in secure program performance.
Address Sanitization. We also performed measurements on
removal of checks inserted by the sanitize=address
compiler pass. These checks are introduced for trapping use-
after-free events; data is shown in Figure 5. As can be
noted, the improvements in the run time overhead of Ad-
dress Sanitizer range between 15-40%. Many of the address
sanitization checks that are removed are associated with non-
pointer variables. We note that a significant portion of Address
Sanitizer’s overhead depends also on another instrumentation
of the program aimed at detecting out of bounds checks, which
are not removed in the current implementation. Again, most
benchmarks exhibit substantial recovery of overhead.
Summary. Results of our benchmark experiments are en-
couraging, although varying widely with the programs and
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Fig. 5: Address Check Benchmark Performance
Benchmark Safecode IOC ASAN
oggenc 0.28  0.00 0.21  0.21 3.48  2.68
LasPack 30.30  30.30 0.97  0.42 4.29  3.57
gzip 15.70  14.88 0.22  0.21 0.94  0.20
debie1 46.12  45.61 0.56  0.31 4.46  1.78
appbt 97.97  98.20 4.85  0.03 2.60  2.17
bzip2 70.15  69.52 0.39  0.00 3.87  2.49
susan 18.23  16.46 2.35  1.96 4.12 3.89
quicklz 19.04  18.41 0.59  0.07 1.80  1.30
cpumaxmp64 4.00  4.00 0.09  0.09 0.07  0.05
linpack 28.00  0.91 0.34  0.21 3.44  2.65
NEC-Matrix 55.67  35.33 1.88  0.21 4.63  2.25
TABLE IV: Net Benchmark Overhead Following Check Elim-
ination
more than half the overhead due to runtime security checks,
while in a few cases there is no improvement. The net
overhead for all the experiments is seen in Table IV, where
results in each case are presented as X  Y, where X is the
overhead factor with all checks in place, and Y is the overhead
factor after some checks were removed by our protocols. This
presentation is more revealing than the charts in Figures 3, 4,
and 5, which only illustrate the relative improvements due to
checks removal. Table IV gives the absolute overheads running
the optimized programs, compared with the performance of the
original, unsafe code.
Table IV does not include the time spent by the static
analyzers for deriving the assertions, since this is an operation
that is carried out only once for every program. This time
can also vary widely depending on the analysis depth of the
static analysis. For instance, the -slevel option of Frama-
C’s value analysis specifies a limit on the amount of loop
unrolling, which can be varied depending on the required
precision.
VI. RELATED WORK
Memory safety is a widely studied problem and there exists
a large body of work that addresses it. The large majority of
this work proposes different schemes that instrument programs
to detect and prevent memory errors at runtime [7], [8], [18],
[10], [19], [20], [21], [22], [23], [24]. In these techniques,
a runtime infrastructure is added on top of the programs to
create, update, and query information about every memory
access. These approaches deal both with “spatial memory
safety”, which prevents out of bounds memory errors such
as buffer overflows, and “temporal memory safety”, which
prevents other memory errors dependent on order of execution,
such as use-after-free and double-free.
These techniques can incur high overheads. This issue is
widely recognized and several optimization efforts have been
carried out. Almost all of these optimizations, however, deal
with the efficiency of the runtime infrastructure added to the
program. Address Sanitizer ([8]), for example, uses shadow
memory, which computes the location of the status information
very quickly; other approaches incorporate different efficient
data structures ([25]). A recent approach in the direction of
removing runtime checks is ASAP, which, given a budget on
the maximal desired overhead, profiles the programs, ranks
the runtime checks in order of their execution counts, and
removes the most frequent ones [26]. However, this system
makes no safety guarantees, and it may remove checks which
are necessary for safety.
[16], [6] tackle the problem of propagating assertions in a
compiler. [16] develops the theory using refinement relations
and [6] provides a simple concrete instance of this approach.
Our work is more comprehensive in this regard, by developing
a detailed system design and implementation, applying it to
several bounds checks and evaluating with large benchmarks.
Several verification efforts show that if the input code is
free of memory errors, so is the output code [1], [2], [3], [4].
However, they do not sanitize errors in the input code.
Lee et al., instrument the intermediate code to keep track
of pointer aliases at runtime. In addition, the code is also
instrumented to nullify all the aliases of a pointer when that
pointer is freed [18].
Other techniques rely on changing the memory allocation
layouts, so that memory safety errors do not occur, or occur
with low likelihood [27], [21], [11]. Among these, Pool
Allocation is a strategy to detect and prevent memory safety
errors [11]. It relies on a type homogeneous allocation strategy
(where variables of the same type are allocated in the same
memory pool) to enable restrictions on the memory regions
that are allocated and referenced. However, this strategy works
only on a subset of the C language.
DieHard and Cling use additional memory space to decrease
the likelihood of accessing previously allocated memory ad-
dresses [27], [21]. However, they come with a high memory
usage overhead.
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Additional tools, created in the context of program debug-
ging, can be used to detect memory errors. Among these,
Valgrind’s Memcheck [28] and Electric Fence [29] also have
a very high overhead both in memory and running time.
Similarly to our approach, USHER [30], analyses
programs at compile time to remove unnecessary checks
inserted by MemorySanitizer (http://clang.llvm.org/docs/
MemorySanitizer.html) to detect uninitialized reads. However,
they build their own analysis framework for this specific
problem inside LLVM, while in our approach, we use existing
tools to feed analysis information inside the LLVM backend.
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we present a framework for improving the
performance of programs instrumented with run time checks.
Our framework uses external analysis tools to complement the
compiler’s analysis and provide information for proving spatial
and temporal safety of memory operations. Our contribution
is providing a mechanism to transmit constraint information
discovered by the external tools through the compiler phases,
to explicitly target removal of unnecessary runtime checks.
This mechanism significantly alleviates much of the perfor-
mance burden due to incorporation of memory safety checks,
and is a significant step towards acceptance of compiler-based
security defenses in production software.
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